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1 INTRODUCTION 
During recent decades Mexican society has experienced profound transitions in the economic, 
political, and demographic arenas. Forty years ago, Mexico had high population growth, a unique 
hegemonic political party system and a closed economy. Today the country has changed completely: 
demographic growth has declined significantly, there is a democratic political system and the economy is 
one of the most open in the world.  
However, recent decades were also characterized by poor economic performance and poverty levels 
that have increased considerably, making increases in economic opportunities more difficult to create. 
Additionally, it is expected that the population will grow from 100 million to 130 million people during 
the next 30 years.1 Therefore, in order to generate the necessary opportunities, Mexican society faces 
several challenges in the economic, educational, medical and social security sectors.. Several structural 
changes are needed to provide the necessary conditions for better living standards.   
An important challenge caused by the demographic transition is the accelerated process of aging of 
Mexican society during the next decades. Today the majority of the population is relatively young, but 
given projected life expectancy, the number of people over 60 years of age will increase in absolute and 
relative terms during a short period of time. This will change the structure of labor markets and  the social 
security system, given the proportional decrease of the workforce and the increase of older workers.   
Low income workers need to find secure ways to increase their wealth at the end of their working life. 
Even in the presence of low dependency ratios, pension systems in Mexico face a permanent crisis caused 
by poor administration of reserves and weak institutions. 
This paper analyzes the structure and perspectives of the current pension system, introduced in 1997 
as part of Mexico’s structural changes. In particular, it focuses on the effects of the system on poverty 
after retirement and emphasizes the redistributive component of its design. In addition, there is an 
analysis of alternative forms for financing pensions at the end of the working lives of affiliates. Finally, 
there are some recommendations to improve the functioning and financing of the system. 
                                                 
1 National Population Council (CONAPO) Population Projections.  
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2 PENSION SYSTEMS AND POVERTY IN MEXICO 
2.1 THE STRUCTURE OF SOCIAL SECURITY IN MEXICO 
Social security is provided by two major groups of institutions in Mexico: one for private sector 
workers through the Social Security Institute (IMSS) and a housing fund (INFONAVIT). The second 
covers public sector employees at the Federal and state level through a dedicated Social Security Agency 
(ISSSTE) and a second housing fund (FOVISSTE). IMSS and ISSSTE essentially provide insurance for 
health and maternity, old age retirement, severance at old age, disability, , child-care services and workers 
compensation. INFONAVIT is a housing agency managed by the government and representatives of 
labor and business organizations. It was created in 1972 with the purpose of providing affordable housing 
to workers employed in the formal sector and affiliated to IMSS. In addition there are several systems at 
the state and municipal levels and organizations covering workers of the public oil company (PEMEX), 
the army and the navy. The total number of contributors to any social security system is 16.5 million. 
Pension schemes of these systems, generally of the Pay as You Go (PAYGO) variety, have faced 
financial imbalances caused by economic crises and low growth of formal jobs: contributions have not 
been enough to provide the benefit levels promised.  
Figure 1: Coverage and Structure of Mexican Social Security Systems  
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Structural reforms of social security started in 1997 with the reform to the IMSS pension system. 
Since that time, private sector workers have a Defined Contribution (DC) system with individual accounts 
administered by specialized companies denominated Administradoras de Fondos para el Retiro (AFORES, by 
its Spanish acronym). 
2.2 PENSIONS AND POVERTY CONDITIONS OF THE ELDERLY 
According to the new poverty measures, 52 percent of people over 65 years old do not have enough 
income to satisfy daily requirements necessary to live in adequate conditions. The low coverage of the 
elderly population by any pension system and the reduction of pension value over time explain this 
situation.2 In addition, there is no universal benefit for the elderly, and public programs have very low 
coverage. Some exceptions include a program for urban elderly that provides 10 liters of milk to every 
beneficiary each week. And some local governments, such as that of Mexico City, are implementing 
electronic cash transfers to people over 70 years old. Nevertheless, there is no fiscal sustainability for this 
kind of benefit. 
Figure 2: Poverty Conditions of Population Over 65 Years (Million People) 
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Source: Author’s estimation based on information of ENIGH 2000. 
Demographic transition will increase the number of elderly in absolute and relative terms during the 
coming decades, putting stress on the current structure and functioning of social security systems.3 
During the next 20 years, the population over 65 years old will more than double. Given current wage 
levels, if economic conditions do not allow workers to contribute to pension systems, a poor and elderly 
society will likely result.  
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THE PENSION SYSTEM FOR PRIVATE SECTOR WORKERS 
The IMSS pension system was designed as a defined benefit scheme and was originally financed 
according to a scaled premium system, accumulating the reserves needed to finance the cost of future 
pension liabilities. Actuarial reserves of pensions were used to build basic infrastructure: funds were used 
for hospitals and medical technology in order to satisfy the growing demand for services in rural areas. 
Pensioners paid this cost by reducing the value of their monthly payments each year and by receiving low 
quality services. The benefit formula was designed to redistribute in favor of low income workers, but 
given labor market conditions and the failures of the institutional structure, these workers generally did 
not receive any benefits, even though they contributed during their working life to the pension fund. In 
other words, the system was sometimes regressive and did not recognize the rights of low income 
workers whose contributions financed, at least in part, the pensions of higher income workers. Financial 
imbalance and institutional problems led the system to accumulate a financial deficit that was valued at 
141 per cent of GDP.4  
A first attempt to reform the system was undertaken in 1992, when the government implemented a 
compulsory system of individual savings accounts that complemented the PAYGO scheme. It was 
denominated “System for Retirement Savings” (SAR -Sistema de Ahorro para el Retiro). Individual accounts 
were comprised of two subaccounts: one for additional savings (2% of wages) and the other a housing 
account (with the balance managed by INFONAVIT). Nevertheless, this system had serious failures in its 
performance: regulatory frameworks were not sufficiently developed and implementation was not 
properly monitored.  In addition, the multiplicity of workers’ identification  numbers generated an 
excessive number of personal accounts. This  complicated and aggravated monitoring  problems.  
Financial imbalance of the system and the structural failures of the IMSS pension and SAR systems 
obligated authorities and congressmen to design a new reform. In December 1995, the Mexican Congress 
approved legislation to reform the existing social security law and shift the pension system for workers in 
the private sector to a privately managed defined-contribution system. 
This pension reform is the second major plank of the IMSS reform. By creating a compulsory fully 
funded capitalization system, the reform has addressed potential problems of financial viability over the 
long-run; and by making pension rights fully portable for affiliated workers, it has strengthened the links 
                                                                                                                                                                     
2 New poverty measures are described in Annex 1.  
3 The explanation of this transition is described in Annex 2. 
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between workers’ contributions and benefits, thereby increasing the attractiveness of formal activity and 
full income declaration.  
2.3 THE STRUCTURE OF THE IMSS DEFINED CONTRIBUTION SYSTEM 
The new system,  in place since mid-1997, operates with individual pension accounts and is based on 
three pillars: private, public and voluntary. The administration of the individual retirement accounts is 
made through Retirement Fund Administrators (AFORES), which are private entities that  compete for 
funds through interest paid on accounts and commissions. Each worker may choose his or her personal 
AFORE. The reform also opened a large market for life annuities. AFORES invest retirement savings in 
the market by using specialized funds denominated SIEFORES. The idea is that compulsory savings will 
increase total private savings, rather than substitute for other uncertain forms of savings. Since the 
government pays the cost of transition from a pay-as-you-go to a capitalization system,5 the principal 
short-run impact has been a shift from public to private saving.  
Initially, an AFORE was limited to operate only one SIEFORE, which must invest in fixed income 
securities and inflation-protected instruments. As markets developed and the system became more widely 
understood, other SIEFORES emerged for voluntary savings. Ultimately, investments permitted by the 
SIEFORES include instruments such as financial derivatives.6 Nevertheless, there are still rigid 
investment rules. 
According to the new law’s transition provisions, employees who made contributions under the 
former law will be able to choose their retirement benefits – selecting either the former benefits or the 
accumulated funds in their individual accounts. Since the majority of the retirees in the near future will 
probably have very small individual accounts, they will likely decide to retire under the former law.  
Under the new pension system, the employer, employee and government together will contribute 6.5 
percent of a worker's wages to an individual retirement account. Legislators decided to establish an 
additional government contribution called the “Cuota Social,” which represents 5.5 per cent of the 
minimum wage at the time the new system takes effect, in order to benefit low income workers. 
                                                                                                                                                                     
4 Grandolini and Cerda, 1998. 
5Workers no longer pay their contributions to the IMSS but rather to their individual pension saving accounts. But during the 
transition, the government is paying the gap between what the worker has accumulated in his or her account and what he or 
she is entitled to receive under the old scheme -- workers already in the old system have the option to choose under which 
scheme they will receive benefits. 
6 It is expected that funds will be used for of financing projects such as housing, regional development and infrastructure 
(highways, airports, telecommunications, railways, power generation, ports, and water supply and treatment facilities). 
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Subsequently, the government's cuota social contribution will be indexed to the Mexican consumer price 
index. Employees are also allowed to make additional voluntary contributions to their accounts.  
There is also a housing sub-account in the new system that is still administered by INFONAVIT. 
This fund is financed by a contribution of 5 percent of wages and upon retirement will be used to 
purchase the life annuity and survival insurance of the pensioner. Together with the old age and 
retirement sub-account, this housing sub-account will finance the worker’s pension upon retirement. The 
complete structure of contributions is showed in Table 1 below. 
Table 1: Structure of Contributions to the New Pension System 
Concept Worker Employer Government Total Base Limit 
Retirement  2.000%  2.000% Base Salary 
25 
Minimum 
Wages 
Old Age 1.125% 3.150% 0.225% 4.500% Base Salary 
17 
Minimum 
Wages 
Cuota Social   5.500% 5.500% One Minimum Wage  
Housing  5.000%  5.000% Base Salary 
17 
Minimum 
Wages 
 Source: Social Security Law, 1997. 
The amount of the pension will depend on the size of an individual’s account at retirement age: 
contributions accumulated during the affiliates’ working life, plus investment returns, minus paid 
commissions. For eligibility to retire with a pension, the worker must be at least 65 years old. In the case 
of severance at old age, the requirement is reduced to 60 years. After 1,250 weeks of contributions to the 
individual account, the worker has two options: purchase an annuity from a private insurance company 
which guarantees a fixed monthly pension, or receive programmed withdrawals from the AFORE. 
In addition, the new law includes a guaranteed minimum pension in retirement, as well as disability 
and death benefits. Effective July 1st, 1997, this guaranteed minimum pension equals the minimum wage, 
which will increase in subsequent years according to the inflation rate. The government will be 
responsible for financing these pensions. This has a very important effect on the fiscal cost of the reform, 
given the current level of wages and contributions.7 
 
                                                 
7 More than 60 per cent of total affiliates to IMSS earn less than 3 minimum wages. If workers do not accumulate enough 
resources in their individual account, fiscal costs will increase due to the minimum pension guarantee. 
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3 THE EVOLUTION OF THE SYSTEM 
At the start of the new pension system, 17 AFORES and 17 SIEFORES were formed and authorized 
for operations. Starting February 3, 1997, they began operation, competing to administer the accounts of 
as many workers as possible. After 70 months, 7 different AFORES merged with another fund manager 
and two more were authorized to operate. Last April there were more than 29.8 million workers 
registered in an AFORE and more than $4,856 million dollars invested in the SIEFORES.   
Figure 3: Affiliates to the DC Pension System 
Millions of Affiliated Workers to the New 
Pension System Affiliated Workers by Wage Range 
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There have been minor changes in the structure of the system since its implementation. The basic 
differences are the authorization of two SIEFORES for voluntary savings, and lower investment 
restrictions for SIEFORES. Now it is possible to invest in qualified public enterprises and local and 
municipal bonds. It is also possible to invest in bonds denominated in US dollars, but only if issued by the 
Mexican Federal Government. Another change in the system is the portability of the 2% contribution to 
System for Retirement Savings (SAR) accounts from public workers who are inscribed in the ISSSTE.8 
This allows bureaucrats to consolidate their multiple accounts and provides the right to invest voluntary 
savings in the privately-administered system. Nevertheless, there are multiple differences between 
pensions systems and the rights for workers who switch from IMSS to ISSSTE and vice versa are not 
recognized in a unified structure. In other words, there is no full portability between the most important 
pension systems of the country. 
                                                 
8 This change was approved by Congress in December of 2000. 
 10
4 EVALUATION OF DISTRIBUTIVE ELEMENTS OF THE PRIVATE 
PENSION SYSTEM 
As mentioned in section 3, there are two distinctive elements of the IMSS defined contribution 
pension system: the minimum pension guarantee and the Cuota Social. In the first case, the effect is 
similar to a minimum rate of return: if the worker contributes the required 1,250 weeks to his individual 
account, no matter the balance, he is entitled to a minimum pension equivalent to one minimum salary of 
1997. For the second case, the relative impact is greater for low-income than high-income workers. The 
main outcome is based on the final personal balance at the time of retirement, and also depends on the 
effect of commissions charged by individual AFORES. In order to analyze these effects, the next sections 
compare and describe the structure of commissions in different scenarios.  
4.1 DESCRIPTION, COMPARISIONS AND EFFECTS OF COMMISSIONS 
According to the Law governing individual accounts, AFORES can only charge commissions using 
uniform bases, and they can not discriminate against any worker. Commissions are intended to 
compensate the pension fund system for the entire range of expenses that AFORES incur in the process 
of carrying out the key functions of a pension plan: collection of contributions, fund management, record 
keeping, and management of benefit payments. These commissions should include normal profit and 
some proportion of start-up costs. Commissions can be based on account assets, on the flow of 
contributions, or on a mixed scheme, as shown in the following table: 
Table 2: Authorized Commissions 
AFORE % Of wage  Annual % of Assets Annual % of real return 
ALIANZ DRESDNER 1.60% 0.50%  
AZTECA 1.30% 0.15%  
BANAMEX 1.70% 0.00%  
BANCOMER 1.68% 0.00%  
BANORTE GENERALLI 1.40% 0.70%  
INBURSA                       -  0.00% 33% 
ING  1.68% 0.00%  
PRINCIPAL 1.60% 0.45%  
PROFUTURO / GNP 1.67% 0.70%  
SANTANDER/MEXICANO 1.60% 1.00%  
XXI 1.40% 0.20%  
Source: CONSAR. 
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4.1.1 THE MODEL TO COMPARE COMMISSIONS  
Commissions reported in Table 2 are difficult to compare. To do this, it is necessary to make some 
specific assumptions related to wage levels, period of contributions, and real rates of return. The 
methodology to make these comparisons is developed in this section. It uses a transformation of 
commissions to express them with the same base: contribution, balance or real interest rate. 
The model is based on several assumptions used to calculate the personal balance of the worker 
during a period of time, the wage level, the structure of commissions (including any discount for 
permanency) and an equal rate of return for each SIEFORE.9  
It approximates a balance, not a commission, using this group of assumptions. Consequently, the 
variable is the “equivalent commission,” not the balance, that is comparable among workers with the 
same characteristics in different AFORES during a certain period of time. It is important to note that 
projections are made annually and in real terms in order to simplify the estimations.  
The model is organized as follows: the first step is to determine the commission flow.  
This methodology would be described algebraically as follows: 
a. Commission flow 
 
ttktk Wcf ,, α=        (1) 
Where: 
k= AFORE  
t = year 
cf = commission on contribution charged by each AFORE in year t  
w = Contribution Level Wage in t, in multiple of the minimum wage 
α= commission as % of Contribution Level Wage charged by each AFORE in year t. 
                                                 
9 This method is also useful to determine the optimal AFORE for every worker according to his characteristics and the time he 
is expected to participate in the system. 
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b. Commission on Real Interest Rate 
)1(ˆ ,,, tktktk ii ρ−=       (2) 
Where: 
tki ,ˆ = real interest rate obtained by SIEFORE in time t 
ρk,t  = commission on real interest rate  
i k,t = net real interest rate 
c. Commission on Balance  
The commission on balance must be calculated on the accumulated contributions and on the net 
interest rate obtained by every SIEFORE. Accordingly, the method to calculate it is as follows: 
( )( ) tktttk cfdccsWincWC ,1, 065.01 −⋅+⋅+⋅= −     (3) 
Where: 
W = wage level (multiple of the minimum wage) 
Winc = annual wage increase 
cs = cuota social 
dc = contribution density in year t 
The annual balance of an individual account is based on the accumulation pattern: previous 
contributions plus interest rates and new contributions. This can be represented as follows: 
For t = 0 
Bk,0 = SAR      (4) 
For t >0 
( ) ( ) 



−⋅−⋅+⋅+=
− 2
111)( ,,1,,
tk
ktktktk
cb
iCBB β     (5) 
Where: 
ak,t = Contribution to AFORE k, in year t. 
cbk,t = Commission on balance of AFORE k, in year t.  
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d. Equivalent commission on Contribution 
( )
w
M
BBcs
cf t
t
065.0
1
'
0 

 −
−+
=       (6) 
Where: 
( )( )[ 10 ˆ11 −+−= tiSARB β ]       (7) 
0B = Initial balance 
cf’ = equivalent commission on contribution 
( ) ( i
i
iM
t
t
ˆ1ˆ
1ˆ1
+




−+
= )      (8) 
e. Equivalent Commission on Wage 
fc ′= 065.0'α        (9) 
 
Where: 
cf’ = equivalent commission on contribution 
α’ = commission of contribution as percentage of wage 
f. Equivalent Commission on Balance 
β’ = % of commission on balance, given: 
( ) ( )[ ] 0
1
)ˆ1('1065. BicswB
nt
n
t ++−+=′ ∑
=
β     (10) 
( ) ( 05.195.0 ttt BBB ≤′≤ )  
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g. Equivalent Commission on Real Interest Rate 
ρk,t’ = % of the commission on real interest rate, given: 
( ) ( )
)'1(ˆ'
1'1065. 0
ρ−=
+



−+
+=′
ii
S
i
icswB
t
t       (11) 
and   ( ) ( 05.195.0 ttt BBB ≤′≤ )
4.1.2 EQUIVALENCE OF COMMISSIONS: AN EXAMPLE  
Let us assume the characteristics of a representative affiliated worker to the system. The 
characteristics are: 
 Wage: 3 times the minimum wage. 
 Real wage growth: 0% 
 Real annual investment returns: 3.5% and 5% 
 Holding periods: 25 and 40 years. 
 Initial Balance: $10,000. 
Table 3: Equivalent Commissions on Contributions  
(% of Contributor’s Salary) 
25 years 40 years AFORE 3.00% 5.00%   3.50% 5.00%
ALIANZ DRESDNER  1.93% 1.95% 2.11% 2.16% 
 AZTECA  1.40% 1.41% 1.46% 1.48% 
 BANAMEX  1.52% 1.54% 1.43% 1.46% 
 BANCOMER  1.64% 1.64% 1.64% 1.64% 
 BANORTE GENERALLI  1.87% 1.90% 2.12% 2.19% 
 INBURSA  1.60% 2.30% 2.39% 3.43% 
 ING   1.68% 1.68% 1.68% 1.68% 
 PRINCIPAL  1.90% 1.92% 2.06% 2.11% 
 PROFUTURO / GNP  2.12% 2.16% 2.37% 2.44% 
 SANTANDER/MEXICANO  2.24% 2.29% 2.59% 2.68% 
 TEPEYAC  1.70% 1.71% 1.76% 1.77% 
 XXI  1.54% 1.55% 1.61% 1.64% 
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As the above table shows, for AFORES with commissions on assets, the equivalent commission on 
flow increases with the holding period and with the real return of the fund. Also, if the real interest rate 
increases, the equivalent commission also increases significantly for the AFORE with commissions on 
real interest rates. For example, in the 25 year period, if the average interest rate is 3%, the AFORE with 
the lower commission is INBURSA, but if the interest rate is 5%, INBURSA becomes the most 
expensive. 
There are significant differences in prices (commissions) charged by every AFORE: in the first 
example, the difference between the AFORE with the highest (SANTANDER) and lowest commission 
(INBURSA) is 1.67 times; in the third column (40 years and 3% of real interest rate), the difference 
increases to 1.81 times between SANTANDER and BANAMEX. 
Commissions of privately-administrated pension systems have a substantial impact on government 
budgets: higher commissions reduce AFORES investments and eventually, pensions, given the lower 
balances obtained by workers. This is significant in terms of system efficiency, especially for low income 
workers: since they do not accumulate sufficient resources in their individual accounts, associated fiscal 
costs will increase, given the government’s obligation to provide a minimum pension. 
The privately-managed pension system is designed to be based on competition among fund 
administrators. This should be reflected in lower prices charged to affiliates and not in economic gains. 
The basic assumption is of the workers’ comprehension of benefits and costs of the system, as reflected 
in the permanent search for the best administrator according to their preferences.   
Nevertheless, the system reports a very low number of switches of individual accounts among 
AFORES.10 This is explained by the fact that authorities tried to prevent high levels of commissions 
derived from continuous switches in the system.11 They allowed the right of one switch of AFORE per 
year and created a complicated switching process for the worker. As a result, the level of commissions has 
been maintained, given the low response from workers to the prices charged by their AFORE.  
Authorities have eased the rules for switches among AFORES since 2000, but there has been no 
response from affiliated workers. This is evinced by the low promotion from AFORES to invite workers 
                                                 
10 According to CONSAR, at the end of April 2003, only 465,708 workers switched to another AFORE since November of 
1998. This represents 1.5% of the universe. 
11 The Chilean experience is clear: the number of switches and the “gifts” given by AFPs to new affiliates increased 
administrative costs of the system, and the level of commissions increased.  
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affiliated to other AFORES.12 It is expected that entry of new AFORES and the inclusion of bureaucrats 
with SAR accounts to the system will increase competition and reduce price differences charged for 
account administration.  
4.1.3 COMMISSIONS AND CUOTA SOCIAL: DISTRIBUTIVE EFFECTS  
Higher administrative costs translate into greater expenditures to finance the guaranteed minimum 
pension. Public contributions are justified on grounds of efficiency, benefits and distributive effects of the 
system. In the Mexican case, as described before, the government supplements individual contributions 
with a flat subsidy of 5.5 per cent of the 1997 minimum wage, which all workers receive regardless of 
their income level.  
The current value of this “cuota social” is 2.51425 pesos per working day. This is 6.05% of a current 
minimum wage, given adjustments for inflation since June 1997. As shown in Figure 3, more than 68.5 
percent of workers earn less than 3 minimum wages, and for these workers, the cuota social represents 
more than the average commission on contributions. In other words, the cuota more than eliminates the 
effect of commissions on the contributions of low income workers, given that AFORES can not charge 
any commission on the cuota social. The following figure and table describes the cuota social in terms of 
the commission paid by workers to AFORES.  
Figure 4: Cuota Social as Multiple of the Commission on Wages 
3.39
1.69
1.13
0.85
0.68
0.34
0.23 0.17 0.14
-
0.50
1.00
1.50
2.00
2.50
3.00
3.50
1 2 3 4 5 10 15 20 25
Number of Minimum Wages  
 
                                                 
12 In Industrial Organization terms, there are signs of collusion among AFORES to maintain the number of workers. 
Nevertheless, this must be probed in a rigorous way.  
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Table 4: The Reverse Effect of Cuota Social on Commissions 
Salary 
(Multiple of 
Minimum 
Wage) 
Daily Wage 
(Pesos) 
Cuota Social
(Pesos) 
Cuota 
Social as  
%  of Wage
Contribution
(Pesos) 
Commission
= 1.7% of 
Salary 
(Pesos) 
 Contribution 
minus 
Commission 
Net 
Contribution 
(Plus Cuota)
1 43.65  2.51425 5.76% 2.84  0.74  2.10  4.61  
2 87.30  2.51425 2.88% 5.67  1.48  4.19  6.70  
3 130.95  2.51425 1.92% 8.51  2.23  6.29  8.80  
4 174.60  2.51425 1.44% 11.35  2.97  8.38  10.90  
5 218.25  2.51425 1.15% 14.19  3.71  10.48  12.99  
10 436.50  2.51425 0.58% 28.37  7.42  20.95  23.47  
15 654.75  2.51425 0.38% 42.56   11.13  31.43  33.94  
20 873.00  2.51425 0.29% 56.75  14.84  41.90  44.42  
25 1,091.25  2.51425 0.23% 70.93  18.55  52.38  54.89  
* 1.7 on Wage 
 
The cuota social allows low income workers to accumulate more than their complete contributions, 
which increases account balances, and consequently the process of accumulation is higher. This flat 
subsidy would otherwise function as a minimum price charged by AFORES to workers and generate 
distortions in the market given that workers or employers do not pay for it. As can be appreciated in the 
following graph, cuota social represents more than a half of contributions for workers who earn 1 
minimum wage.  
Figure 5: Cuota Social as % of Retirement Contribution 
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4.1.4 COMMISSIONS, MINIMUM PENSION GUARANTEE AND RATES OF RETURN 
Defined contribution systems represent a great challenge for the future. The effectiveness of this 
system is not very clear for low-income workers, who make up the majority of the affiliated population. 
Contribution density (number of weeks contributing to the pension system during working life) is 
significantly lower for low-income workers given the type of occupations they frequently hold in their 
working lives (i.e. construction workers). As a consequence, it will be very hard for the majority of the 
affiliated population to complete the requirements needed to receive a minimum pension.  
The current value of the minimum pension is 1,252 pesos per month.13 To receive an annuity with 
similar characteristics, it is necessary to accumulate 626,035 pesos, as of 2003. This amount is obtained by 
multiplying the value of the minimum pension by 500, the cost of one peso of an annuity.14 As a 
consequence, the interest rate required to exceed the minimum pension guarantee must be extraordinarily 
high, as is shown in the table below. A possible way to receive the amount needed for this guarantee 
would be an extraordinarily successful fund administration by AFORES, as shown below:  
Table 5: Real Return required to Exceed Minimum Pension Guarantee * 
Commission Salary in terms of minimum wage 
On salary 1 2 3 
0.000% 10.87% 7.29% 4.37% 
0.500% 11.14% 7.67% 4.83% 
0.750% 11.29% 7.87% 5.06% 
1.000% 11.44% 8.08% 5.30% 
1.250% 11.59% 8.29% 5.55% 
1.500% 11.74% 8.50% 5.81% 
1.750% 11.90% 8.73% 6.07% 
2.000% 12.06% 8.96% 6.35% 
2.250% 12.22% 9.19% 6.63% 
2.500% 12.39% 9.44% 6.92% 
*40 years of contributions, and INFONAVIT return=0% real  
Nevertheless, given the historical performance of financial markets, the real returns required to exceed 
the minimum pension do not appear feasible. This has important fiscal implications, given that the 
government is obligated to provide a minimum pension once a worker’s personal AFORE-administered 
balance expires.15 
                                                 
13 This is equivalent to 807 pesos (in 1997), indexed by inflation up to February 2003. 
14 IMSS. General Financial Direction. 
15 Article 172 of the Law. 
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Even for low-income workers who complete the requirements for a minimum pension (1,250 weeks 
of contributions and 65 years old), the actual level of contributions is not enough to pay for the annuity 
for the minimum pension. According to the results shown in Table 6, workers with wage levels of 1, 2, or 
3 minimum wages will need approximately 500,000 pesos (43,000 USD) to fund an annuity equivalent to 
the minimum pension. This scenario assumes 25 years of contributions and an interest rate of 3.5 per 
cent.  
Table 6: Balances of a Representative Worker who Contributes 25 years 
Minimum Wages (3.5%) 
AFORE 
1 2 3 
ALIANZ DRESDNER   85,822.08   125,377.69  164,963.38  
AZTECA  90,266.31  132,861.05  175,458.10  
BANAMEX 90,103.64  131,911.45  173,727.11  
BANCOMER  89,412.34  130,522.89  171,653.60  
BANORTE GENERALLI  85,487.57  125,519.67  165,522.56  
INBURSA 82,157.49  124,389.06  166,620.63  
ING  89,149.20  130,014.46  170,904.17  
PRINCIPAL  86,186.18  125,926.33  165,682.73  
PROFUTURO / GNP 83,946.26  122,419.06  160,903.29  
SANTANDER/MEXICANO  82,184.06  120,060.26  157,915.45  
TEPEYAC 88,466.29  129,277.08  170,075.91  
XXI 89,280.66  131,097.62  172,911.09  
System  86,871.84   127,448.05   168,028.17  
Difference for the Min. Pension -539,163.95  -498,587.74  -458,007.63  
 
The implications of these results are important: if these conditions continue, all workers who earn less 
than 3 minimum wages will retire with the minimum pension and fiscal costs will substantially increase. In 
other words, replacement rates will be 100%, 50% and 33% for workers earning 1, 2 and 3 minimum 
wages, respectively.  
An alternative to this scenario is the use of housing contributions (5%) and their accumulation at the 
same interest rate. If the interest rate increases to 5% annually, balances increase significantly, as shown in 
Table 7. Nevertheless, the balance is less than half of the annuity cost.  
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Table 7: Balances of a Worker who Contributes 25 years, Including Housing Subaccount 
Minimum Wages (3.5%) AFORE 
1 2 3 
ALIANZ DRESDNER 137,930.82  216,328.77   294,738.46  
AZTECA 146,185.82  230,949.83   315,693.56  
BANAMEX 144,972.95  227,695.51   310,423.87  
BANCOMER  143,630.86  224,999.26   306,378.18  
BANORTE GENERALLI 138,042.72  217,613.40    297,186.08  
INBURSA 126,351.44  205,606.21    284,860.98  
ING  143,093.30  223,916.55    304,767.04  
PRINCIPAL 138,536.31  217,300.12    296,006.44  
PROFUTURO / GNP 134,643.06  10,805.38  286,987.35  
SANTANDER/MEXICANO 131,996.20  07,081.21  282,172.75  
TEPEYAC 142,256.47  223,090.50   303,892.32  
XXI 144,241.29  227,329.01   310,423.87  
System   139,323.44  219,392.98    299,460.91  
Difference for the Min. Pension -486,712.36  -406,642.81  -326,574.89  
Another alternative is the extension of the working life in order to contribute more weeks and 
accumulate more resources in personal accounts, as shown in Figure 20: contribution years are increased 
to 40 and the rate of return on assets is assumed to be 5%.  
Figure 6: Replacement Rates of Different Income Levels: Individual Account and Fiscal 
Cost with 40 Years o  Contributions f
FISCAL COST 
DERIVED FROM 
MINIMUM 
PENSION
0 20 40 60 80 100
INDIVIDUAL ACCOUNT
%
5 MW
4 MW
3 MW
2 MW
1 MW
WAGE
 
This alternative is not very attractive, as expected labor market conditions during the coming decades 
will likely make this a difficult option. Additionally, it does not seem very rational to maintain 
contributions over an 15 additional years if it is possible to earn the same benefits (in the form of the 
minimum pension) with only 25 years of contributions. In other words, low-income workers would 
choose to contribute less and receive the minimum pension instead of working longer to receive the same 
benefits.  
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4.1.5 MINIMUM PENSION AND CUOTA SOCIAL: ALTERNATIVES FOR FINANCING 
The prospects for low income workers in the new system are not very secure and the fiscal costs 
derived from minimum pensions are quite significant. For this reason, it would be useful to find 
alternative ways to finance minimum pensions for those workers entitled to this right.  
Increasing the cuota social is one such alternative. It could be incorporated as part of the payment 
structure for minimum pensions: bimonthly federal government contributions allow a higher 
accumulation, which reduces the gap between the amount needed for a minimum pension and the 
workers’ individual balance. The increase in the balance of a representative worker is approximately 30 
percent of the total balance, as shown in Table 8:  
Table 8: The Reverse Effect of Cuota Social on Commissions 
25 Years of Contributions 40 Years of Contributions 
AFORE Balance Without 
Cuota 
Balance 
With  
Cuota 
Difference
Balance 
Without 
Cuota 
Balance 
With  
Cuota 
Difference
ALIANZ DRESDNER 137,791.94 181,408.06 31.65% 324,588.43 432,020.84 33.10% 
AZTECA 148,783.29 193,596.59 30.12% 358,321.75 470,837.22 31.40% 
BANAMEX 145,414.09 190,748.95 31.18% 357,173.72 471,959.80 32.14% 
BANCOMER 143,132.64 188,451.94 31.66% 347,025.74 461,842.03 33.09% 
BANORTE GENERALLI 139,642.51 182,603.64 30.77% 325,704.91 430,329.02 32.12% 
INBURSA 137,857.55 173,556.00 25.90% 283,526.63 359,896.59 26.94% 
ING  142,222.48 187,536.12 31.86% 344,631.50 459,411.47 33.31% 
PRINCIPAL 138,405.65 182,175.61 31.62% 326,998.57 435,085.14 33.05% 
PROFUTURO / GNP 133,899.47 176,852.56 32.08% 311,687.74 416,302.15 33.56% 
SANTANDER/MEXICANO 131,865.68 173,825.74 31.82% 301,959.99 402,479.38 33.29% 
TEPEYAC 142,109.18 186,918.62 31.53% 341,619.46 454,114.82 32.93% 
XXI 145,903.36 190,538.81 30.59% 350,185.01 461,963.93 31.92% 
System 140,585.65 184,017.72 30.90% 331,118.62 438,020.20 32.24% 
Differenece to Min. Pension -485,450.14 -442,018.07  -294,917.17 -188,015.59  
Given the scenario described previously, an alternate way to finance minimum pensions in the long 
term is through an increase in the cuota social. Fiscal pressures would accumulate at the moment of 
retirement., but these would be reduced in the future if governments increase their contributions to 
individual accounts: the professional management of resources would result in a higher return for fiscal 
resources.  
The next table shows this alternative: the cuota social increases to 10% of a minimum wage of 1997, 
with a real return of 5% for the retirement and housing sub-accounts and 25 years of contributions:  
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Table 9: Balances of a Worker who Contributes 25 years, Including Housing Subaccount 
Minimum Wages (3.5%) AFORE 
1 2 3 
ALIANZ DRESDNER 185,713.08  271,932.90   358,209.18  
AZTECA 197,422.09  292,033.73  386,628.01  
BANAMEX 196,405.82  288,541.99  380,674.38  
BANCOMER 194,011.86  283,744.09  373,446.26  
BANORTE GENERALLI 185,680.33  273,749.32  361,854.87  
INBURSA 167,352.99  56,867.38  346,381.77  
ING  193,255.62  282,198.43   371,159.07  
PRINCIPAL 186,600.04  273,222.07   359,900.98  
PROFUTURO / GNP 181,032.28  264,436.61   347,887.88  
SANTANDER/MEXICANO 177,168.40  259,422.17   341,731.34  
TEPEYAC 191,991.41  281,107.41   370,248.74  
XXI 194,702.29  287,016.82   379,402.88  
System  187,611.35  276,189.41   364,793.78  
Difference for the Min. Pension -438,424.44  -349,846.38  -261,242.01  
Difference with previous scenario  100,739.51  148,741.36  196,765.61  
The gap between the balance of individual accounts and the cost of a minimum pension is reduced 
significantly. Increasing the cuota social would reduce the fiscal cost of minimum pensions. In this 
alternative, a flat subsidy would be paid for all years, although it would be feasible to implement a 
differentiated scheme according to the number of years of contribution to the system. This would allow 
low-income workers to increase their chances to have a decent retirement, reducing the likelihood of  old-
age poverty. 
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5 CHALLENGES AND CONCLUSIONS 
Currently, more than half the Mexican population over 60 years old lives in poverty. There is no 
universal social public assistance for elderly in the country, and this population depends on personal 
savings and family transfers to live. Most of the elderly population living above the poverty line worked in 
the formal sector and are generally covered by the IMSS or ISSSTE social security systems. As a 
consequence, it is very  important to extend the coverage of these systems to the working age population.  
Mexican social security systems will face several challenges during the next decades. Demographic 
transition will accelerate the process of aging of Mexican society in a short period of time. This transition 
will change the structure of labor markets and the structure of social security systems. If Mexico does not 
find a way to increase wealth at the end of the working life, it will have to deal with an old and poor 
society, as a consequence of the increase of old people living in poverty. 
In order to prevent this scenario, this paper suggests a mechanism to increase the incentives for 
workers that will induce their participation in the formal sector of the economy and will lead them to 
accumulate resources for their future. With this new system, workers covered by the IMSS social security 
system could save for their future by taking advantage of the personal accounts offered in the current 
fully funded pension system, which were created by the 1997 reform.  
Personal balances in this system depend on the specific characteristics of workers and the 
administrative performance of AFORES. This paper contains a methodology to simulate the 
accumulation path of individual accounts and compare commission schemes by imputing individual 
characteristics and basic variables of macroeconomic scenarios.  
According to the results obtained by using this model, those workers who earn less than 3 minimum 
wages (the average contribution income of IMSS affiliates) and comply with the requirements at the time 
of retirement (1,250 weeks of contributions and 65 years old) will likely retire with the guaranteed 
minimum pension, which is equivalent to one minimum wage of 1997 indexed by inflation, no matter the 
balance of the individual account.  
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This paper proposes to increase individual balances of low income workers by increasing the cuota 
social. This will attract more workers to the system and will reduce the fiscal cost of minimum pensions. 
The cuota social is a component of the defined contribution scheme: a flat benefit for affiliates in the 
pension system (5.5 per cent of a minimum wage of 1997), that accounts for at least 25 percent of total 
contributions for workers earning less than 3 minimum wages. In a conservative macroeconomic 
scenario, an increase of the cuota social to 10 per cent would reduce the cost of minimum pensions by  at 
least 5 percent. 
Increasing the amount of the cuota social would also reduce the fiscal cost of transition: personal 
balances are managed by specialized companies and the average return could be higher compared to those 
generated by public administration. Consequently, the Mexican government could save future revenues by 
decreasing the cost of transfers to the new pension system.  
In the short run, there will not be substantial fiscal savings derived from the new system for two 
reasons. The first is the government's pension guarantee to workers who contributed to the old system 
and decided to retire with it. Consequently, these workers will opt for the highest accessible pension 
regardless of the accumulated balance of their accounts and the commissions they actually pay to the 
AFORES. Second, the minimum pension guarantee for new workers with low incomes is not sufficient 
incentive for their participation in the system nor to switch to the AFORE with the lowest commission 
scheme.  
The paper also recognizes some failures in the Mexican pension system’s design that must be tackled. 
Special mention must be made of the prevalent role of the housing-fund component. A share of 
minimum pensions is actually financed with unused housing balances, which belong to those workers 
who did not obtain a credit for their houses and instead accumulated funds in their personal housing 
subaccounts. However, if this fund is not well administered and financial resource accumulation is not 
positive in real terms, fiscal costs will increase considerably. 
Finally, the current market structure does not generate incentives for greater involvement of workers 
in the decision of switching to the best AFORE according to prices (commissions), personal 
characteristics and needs. This does not generate incentives for more competition and commissions 
reduction, which will also increase the fiscal cost of the reform.  
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6 ANNEX I. NEW POVERTY LINES IN MEXICO 
During recent decades there was no official measure for national poverty that indicated the exact size 
of the population living in poverty during that period. In 2002, the Mexican Ministry of Social 
Development established an official measure of poverty. It measures welfare by personal income levels 
reported in official income-expenditure surveys, and compares it with three reference points (income 
levels) in the total population. The first reference point, denominated “Food Poverty,” indicates the 
minimum income required to satisfy daily food requirements. The second point, “Capacities Poverty,” 
indicates the required income to satisfy food, health, education, shelter, dressing and transportation. 
Finally, the third point, “Patrimony Poverty,” indicates the income required to satisfy additional needs. 
The results of this measure are shown in the table below.  
Table 10: Poverty Measure in Mexico, 2000 
Poverty Type %of Households and 
persons 
Urban, 
USD per day 
Rural, 
USD per day
Patrimony Households: 45.9% Persons: 53.7% $4.18 $2.81 
Capacities Households: 25.3% Persons: 31.9% $2.47 $1.89 
Food Households: 18.6% Persons: 24.2% $2.09 $1.54 
Source: Comité Técnico para la Medición de la Pobreza. Currency rate= 10 pesos per dollar. 
Today, more than 50 percent of the Mexican population lives on less than 4.18 USD every day. As 
will be shown in the next section, there is a direct correlation between poverty levels with economic 
performance and the provision of social security. Formal social institutions do not permanently cover the 
great majority of persons who do not have enough income to satisfy basic needs, and this population is 
generally employed in occupations with high levels of informality. Some people who are living under the 
third poverty threshold commonly work in sectors with a lower level of informality, but with a high level 
of labor rotation, such as the construction sector; their participation in social security systems is not 
permanent. In general terms, people living below these poverty lines have not reached retirement age. 
As income is more concentrated, especially in the last deciles of distribution, it is highly possible to 
find high levels of poverty given the levels of personal income. Poverty levels diminish in the presence of 
economic growth through a direct increase in the average income levels. The combination of 
demographic growth and low economic performance has increased significantly the absolute number of 
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people in poverty conditions. During the 1990’s, eighty per cent of the additional population was born in 
poverty conditions. 
Future poverty levels will depend on the demographic and economic trends of the next decades. Even 
under optimistic scenarios of economic growth, it is not probable that the Mexican economy will generate 
enough formal jobs for the young people who will be demanding positions. Consequently, as will be 
shown, the number of people living in poverty will likely increase considerably, even with a reduction in 
the relative incidence of poverty, during the next decades. Additionally, this process could be worse in 
regions where poverty levels are much higher in comparison with others that enjoy more dynamic 
economic activity.  
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7 ANNEX II. DEMOGRAPHIC TRANSITION AND THE CHANGE IN AGE 
PROFILE IN MEXICO 
Demographic trends have changed the current age structure of population, and it will continue to 
change during the coming decades. There has been a relative reduction of people in young age cohorts, 
while the number of people in working-age cohorts has increased significantly. It is calculated that during 
the next 15 years, 1.1 million people annually will enter the labor force. In percentage terms, average 
annual labor force growth will be 2.4 per cent, while population as a whole will increase by 1.8 per cent.  
Given present demographic trends, the population aged 12 years or older will increase by 1.9 per cent 
annually during the next 20 years. But more importantly, the population between 12 and 60 will grow 
even faster, at 2.5 per cent annually.  As a consequence, there will be both an absolute and relative 
increase in the number of elderly.  This will profoundly change the structure and functioning of social 
security systems and health services. 
Figure 7: Mexican Population 1930 - 2030 
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Source: INGI. Census data from 1930 to 2000.  
 and CONAPO. Population Projections 2005-2030. 
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Figure 8: Life Expectancy of Mexican Population (1930 – 2050) 
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Source: CONAPO. 
 
Reduction of mortality and fertility rates and the increase in life expectancy are the main elements of 
demographic transition. But these phenomena can be explained by the convergence of several causal 
elements, such as economic growth and industrialization, migration, urbanization process, social 
development, increase of educational levels, and the connection of regional and international markets. 
These phenomena have contributed to reduce the number of children per woman, making it more costly 
to raise children in absolute and relative terms.  
The process of demographic transition has not been the same for all regions of Mexico, given the 
remarkable social and economic differences of regional populations. Mortality and fertility declines speed 
the pace of group integration in the development process, while marginalized groups are left behind. For 
example, according to CONAPO, women with twelve or more years of schooling (and a fertility rate of 
1.85 children), averaged 1.66 children per woman, while women without schooling averaged 4.7. 
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